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छोटे लोगों को क्या जरूरत है नोट बंदी की 

हम तो 18₹ (अठारा) भी gpay phonepe कर सकते है 

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है ना? दिमाग लगाव और भी बहुत कुछ समज में आएगा 🤣

Was it a मास्टरस्ट्रोक my foot 🦶 

AI (AAI as per PM) Grok reply on 

Terrorism attack after demonetization 

And black money in circulation after demonetization

Let’s address your query about terrorist attacks and black money circulation in India following the demonetization of November 8, 2016, when the Indian government invalidated ₹500 and ₹1,000 banknotes to combat black money, corruption, counterfeit currency, and terrorism financing.

👇🏼👇🏼👇🏼👇🏼

Part one

TERRORIST ATTACKS AFTER DEMONETIZATION

Demonetization was partly aimed at disrupting terrorism by choking cash-based funding networks, as terrorist groups were believed to rely on high-denomination notes, including counterfeit ones, often linked to cross-border operations. The immediate aftermath saw claims of success, with some reports suggesting a temporary decline in certain activities. For instance, Maoist (Naxalite) surrender rates reportedly peaked initially, attributed to a lack of cash flow, and stone-pelting incidents in Jammu and Kashmir were said to have dropped briefly due to disrupted payments.

However, the long-term impact is less clear and widely debated. Data and anecdotal evidence suggest that terrorist activities resumed within months as groups adapted. Notable attacks post-demonetization include:

Sukma Attack (April 24, 2017): Maoists killed 25 CRPF personnel in Chhattisgarh, one of the deadliest Naxal attacks, indicating their operational capacity persisted.

Amarnath Yatra Attack (July 10, 2017): Terrorists killed 7 pilgrims in Jammu and Kashmir, showing that militancy in the region continued unabated.

Pulwama Attack (February 14, 2019): A suicide bombing killed 40 CRPF personnel, executed by Jaish-e-Mohammed, highlighting that major terrorist groups retained funding and logistical capabilities.

Government officials, including then-Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, claimed demonetization reduced terror funding, citing fewer incidents in some areas. However, critics argue that terrorism financing shifted to alternative channels like hawala (informal money transfer systems), cryptocurrencies, or foreign currencies like dollars, which were unaffected by the note ban. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other analyses note that while counterfeit cash took a hit, terrorist networks often rely on diverse funding sources beyond cash, such as drug trafficking or extortion, which demonetization couldn’t address. Overall, while there may have been a short-term disruption, no conclusive evidence shows a sustained decline in terrorist attacks, with incidents in Jammu and Kashmir, Northeast India, and Naxal-affected regions continuing at significant levels.

Part 2

BLACK MONEY IN CIRCULATION AFTER DEMONETIZATION

The primary goal of demonetization was to purge black money—untaxed or illegally acquired wealth—assumed to be hoarded in cash. The government estimated that ₹3-5 trillion (out of ₹15.41 trillion in demonetized notes) would not return to the banking system, effectively extinguishing it. However, the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) 2018 report revealed that 99.3% of the demonetized currency (₹15.31 trillion) was deposited or exchanged, leaving only ₹107 billion unreturned. This suggests that very little black money was actually destroyed.

Why did this happen? Experts point out that black money isn’t primarily held as cash but as assets like real estate, gold, or foreign accounts. Cash hoards were laundered back into the system through intermediaries, shell accounts, or by exploiting the 50-day exchange window. Reports indicate wealthy individuals used low-income proxies to deposit cash, often at a discount, while rural and informal networks facilitated mass exchanges. The RBI and tax authorities later flagged suspicious deposits worth ₹1.75-3 lakh crore, but this was a fraction of the total, and prosecutions have been limited.

Post-demonetization, cash circulation rebounded sharply:

Pre-Demonetization (November 2016): Currency in circulation was ₹17.97 lakh crore.

March 2020: It rose to ₹24.2 lakh crore, per RBI data.

October 2021: It hit a record ₹29.17 lakh crore.

2024: Estimates suggest it reached ₹34 lakh crore, nearly double the 2016 level.

The cash-to-GDP ratio, which dipped from 12% to 8.8% right after demonetization, climbed back to 14% by 2021, signaling India’s persistent cash reliance. Black money estimates remain murky—lacking an official definition or figure—but the IMF pegs India’s shadow economy at 50% of GDP (₹21.82 lakh crore), and the CBI at ₹28 lakh crore. Seizures of unaccounted cash and assets continued post-2016, with examples like ₹150 crore detected in Haryana hospital raids (2022) and ₹250 crore in Tamil Nadu chit fund searches (2022), indicating black money generation wasn’t curbed. Digital payments grew (e.g., UPI transactions soared), but this trend predated demonetization and accelerated due to unrelated factors like the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conclusion

Terrorism: Demonetization may have caused a temporary cash crunch for terrorist groups, but attacks persisted, suggesting adaptation to other funding methods. No definitive data proves a lasting reduction in terror incidents.

Black Money: The policy failed to eliminate black money in circulation, with nearly all cash returning and currency levels doubling since 2016. The shadow economy remains robust, adapting to the shock.

Both outcomes reflect the complexity of these issues, where cash is just one piece of a larger puzzle. Demonetization’s bold intent didn’t fully align with its results, as structural challenges and workarounds diluted its impact.

🤦🏻‍♂️ समज में आया कुछ 

Game तो और कुछ ही था जो आम आदमी इनोसेंट इन्सानों को समज के नहीं आएगा जब तक BLINDके काले चश्मे और 

प्रोपेगेंडा फिल्मों और नॉन-biological की आर्टिफिशियल दुनिया से बाहर आयोगे...

Someone born in 1950

Left home say in 1969 = age 19 approx.

became CM in 2001 age 51

Gap 32 years from left home till becoming CM

So how 35 years bheeksha is real ....

it's a utter white lie

Telling lie no papa

Open your mouth " jooth bolo jooth bolo jooth bolo"

बार बार झूठ बोलो दस बार झूठ बोलो सो बार झूठ बोलो जब तक झूठ को भक्ति में बदल जाए और लोग अंधभक्त बन जाए

$anjay$hah

Founder-Editor

The Reality Muted